

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

This Document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

50X1

COUNTRY	USSR (Leningrad Oblast)	REPORT	
SUBJECT	NII 49, Leningrad - Its Mission and Activities	DATE DISTR.	29 September 1953
DATE OF INFO.		NO. OF PAGES	5
PLACE ACQUIRED		REQUIREMENT	
		REFERENCES	

50X1

50X1-HUM

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.  
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.  
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

50X1-HUM

Comments.

On first page of attachment, paragraph 1, read Petroverigskiy for Petroveriksi.

Change personal names throughout the report as follows:

Barmin to Barnim,  
Dworkina to Dvorkina,  
Grudnitzki to Grudnitskiy,  
Hydrow to Khidrov,  
Katja Michailowa to Katya Mikhaylova,  
Klaritzki to Klaritskiy,  
Sennow to Sennov,  
Tretjakow to Tretyakov, and  
Turjew to Turjev.

On first page of attachment, paragraph 1, makes reference to the Ministry of Shipbuilding; it should be the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry. The navy rank of Captain 1st Grade should be rendered as Captain 1st Rank.

50X1

~~SECRET~~

STATE	#x	ARMY	#x	NAVY	#x	AIR	#x	FBI		AEC						
-------	----	------	----	------	----	-----	----	-----	--	-----	--	--	--	--	--	--

(Note: Washington Distribution Indicated By "X"; Field Distribution By "#".)

50X1

**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

REPORT

50X1-HUM

COUNTRY : USSR (Leningrad Oblast)

DATE DISTR. 1 SEPT 53

SUBJECT : NII 49, Leningrad - Its Mission and Activities

NO. OF PAGES 4

PLACE  
ACQUIREDNO. OF ENCLS.  
(LISTED BELOW)DATE  
ACQUIREDSUPPLEMENT TO  
REPORT NO. 50X1-HUM

DATE OF II

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

50X1-HUM

1. Institute 49, Leningrad, is subordinate to the Ministry of Shipbuilding in Moscow (MSP, Moscow, Petrovskii 10). The ministry deputy responsible for the institute was Navy Captain 1st Grade TRETJAKOW. Because of work done for the Soviets before June 1941, in connection with the sale of cruiser "L" to them, the Soviet Shipbuilding Ministry, and especially TRETJAKOW, was well acquainted with the Kreiselgeraete company and its department heads. Two days after Berlin capitulated, TRETJAKOW appeared at Kreiselgeraete and supervised the dismantling of the entire plant. His chief deputy for this work was Army Colonel LEVIN. TRETJAKOW was also the first person to attempt resuming contact with all former Kreiselgeraete employees, and the establishment of the Keopenick office of Gema was probably due to his initiative.

SECRET

-----  
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

50X1

-2-

2. At first, the firms associated with GEMA were those firms which had formerly done work for the German Navy, and who were thus known to TRETJAKOW; Siemens-Apparatewerk, Berlin-Mariefelds (SAM), the Gesellschaft fuer Elektrische Maschinen und Apparate (GEMA), and the Kreiselgeraete GmbH. The director of this group was Navy Captain GRUDNITZKI, who was to become the Director of Institute 400 in Leningrad. In the course of time, GEMA obtained specialists in torpedo building such as Dr. KROCHMANN, Dr. SCHMIEDECK, etc., as well as larger groups of antiaircraft missile specialists for the Rheintochter, Schmetterling, and Wasserfall missiles from the former Rheinmetall Hentschel, the Army artillery grounds at Penemuende, Telefunken, etc. The latter groups were set up in a parallel group under the supervision of Army Colonel BARMIN. These groups were under the direction of Army Colonel SINELSHIKOW, who seemed to have the same position as TRETJAKOW. During this time, there was continual rivalry between these two groups in order to determine which specialists belonged to which group. The group under the army received special privileges, among which was a special food ration every month.
3. The Kreiselgeraete group in particular was a subject of contention because the company had had a leading part in the development of antiaircraft missiles. This group was officially assigned to the Berlin Institute, which was under the direction of Colonel BARMIN although the immediate chief was Navy Lt. Cndr. KLARITZKI, who came from Institute 49 and thus belonged to the Shipbuilding Ministry. 50X1-HUM

4.

At this point, four men of the former Kreiselgeraete group (BLASIG, SCHIEFERDECKER, HOYER and BUCHNER), who had worked primarily on missile-firing mountings, were separated and assigned to a missile airframe group in the vicinity of Moscow. They were later transferred to Ostashkov. As a replacement for these four men, NII 49 received four others, (RUEDLIN, ROST, ENDERT and NIELBOCK), who had been at Bleicherode and who were primarily missile airframe specialists. These four men were not computer specialists, and had come from various German firms to the Bleicherode group after the war. There they had worked for gyroscope specialist Dr. MAGNUS (formerly at the University of Goettingen).

5. At NII 49 in Leningrad, the Kreiselgeraete specialists, as well as the four exchange specialists, were employed as a group distinct from the Soviet laboratories. The Soviet chief of this group for the first few months was TURJEW. He told the Germans that as soon as he wound up his work in Germany, KLARITZKI would take over the supervision. This work in Germany was probably supervising the shipment of the laboratories left behind at GEMA, as well as such reconstructed equipment as the Schmetterling computer and parts of the Wasserfall computer, and the underlying data and drawings. These articles arrived in Leningrad in March 1947, and with KLARITZKI, who immediately assumed supervision of the group. 50X1-HUM

6.

activity  
at NII 49 was concerned entirely with development work in the armaments field, and security measures were therefore sharply enforced. The activity was so divided (some work was given to other institutes and plants), that even the Soviet specialists seldom got an over-all picture of complete projects and the final goal.

SECRET

SECRET

-3-

50X1

7. The Germans were always under surveillance and it was always very difficult to obtain data for our work, even when it was urgently required. It was impossible for us to get an insight into the Soviet laboratories. The German group of offices could be entered only through one entrance, which was always guarded by sentries armed with a pistol or rifle, and the Soviets working in the institute could enter these rooms only with special passes. In this connection, [ ] only particularly trustworthy men, 50X1-HUM and those working in the parallel Soviet laboratories, had the possibility of direct contact. The German liaison with the institute was primarily through KLARITZKI; the Soviet assigned to the group, engineer HYDROW; technician SENNOW; and the secretaries/ translators, Mrs. DWORKINA and Miss Katja MICHALOWA.
8. Nevertheless there was continual parallel development by the Soviet laboratories, especially in the field of computers, although exclusively with Soviet parts. Often times only data was delivered to the Soviets, such as designs and technical details. The Soviets built the equipment, which the Germans saw only in very rare instances.
9. On the whole [ ] it was one of the main 50X1-HUM duties [ ] to give the Soviet engineers an exact picture of the method of undertaking such development. This was evidenced by the continual questions and the way in which the reports in various fields of endeavor were required. Not only were the Germans required to give the usual technical details and explanations which are usually sufficient for a technical man, but [ ] also had to give detailed descriptions about each phase of development, mathematical data for various parts and the complete apparatus. 50X1-HUM exact information regarding building, calibration, testing, etc. 50X1-HUM
10. This impression seemed to be confirmed in part by the fact that [ ] Germans had relatively few entirely new development projects assigned [ ] However, this may have been a result of the Soviets' desire to keep [ ] in the dark about future development plans they 50X1-HUM might have had.
11. [ ] 50X1-HUM the work at NII 49. Its main activity was ostensibly in the high frequency field and in the radar field. [ ] Institute 49 is primarily a development institution 50X1-HUM for research problems in the field of radar, and the new interest in computer development can be interpreted as belonging to this field as well as being of use in it. Along with this, antennae, electronic tubes, and transmitter developments, e.g., outfitting of radar trucks, three and ten centimeter duplex radio-telephone equipment, etc., were under development. The Stalin prize winners employed at the institute, more than 20 men, were almost all engaged in the high frequency field.
12. [ ] there was also a great deal of basic research done. 50X1-HUM
13. [ ] the institute, [ ] expanded considerably both spatially and in personnel, and, in view of the building under construction, it was to expand still further. [ ] 50X1-HUM about 3,000 people were working here, and it was considered the second largest institute in the Soviet Union.

SECRET

SECRET

50X1

-4-

14. The extraordinary large personnel figure for a research and development institute is the result of many factors not ordinarily associated with research projects. The main reason was the generally observed tendency of all Soviet companies and installations to make everything themselves, since a direct purchase or sale between individual firms is impossible. Everything had to be requisitioned from Moscow and delivery was made only after each factory involved had been included in the general planning. In view of this bureaucratic method, deliveries took a long time. For this reason, the greater part of the required electrical and mechanical parts were fabricated within the institute. This included electronic tubes, potentiometers, transformers, stamping of transformer sheets, assembly of the cores, core winding and parts, various sheet metal work, fabrication of gears, fabrication of various cast parts, and fabrication of various other apparatus, such as coil-winding machines, sheet metal cutting machines, tools, etc.
15. To perform the above, the institute had a large gear hobbing section, a foundry, a large section for surface treating of materials, large electrical and precision-machine fabrication workshops, material inspection sections, etc. Each laboratory also had its own testing workshops, design departments, etc. Plant and equipment were also maintained by plant personnel, including carpenter-, plumbing-, glazing- and paintshops. Another large section was occupied with security, as well as political, social, and medical duties.
16. As the administrative sections, such as personnel, bookkeeping, payroll, etc., were very unwieldy and thoroughly bureaucratic, the number of personnel of these sections were also very great. There was also a motor pool, which had about ten trucks, four omnibusses and about five passenger cars. [redacted] only about ten per cent of the entire personnel at NII 49 were engineers and technicians actually engaged in development work.

50X1-HUM

SECRET